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Abstract: This article undertakes a conceptual enquiry into the history of the
Ottoman/Turkish concept of civilization. It shows how the concept of civiliza-
tion became one of the key elements of political and intellectual thought in
the late Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic. Beginning with the adap-
tion of the idea of civilization in the nineteenth century, the desire to be
recognized as civilized has moulded the thinking of Ottoman and Turkish
elites regardless of their political orientation. From the early Ottoman moder-
nizers to the present-day AKP government the pursuit of medeniyet (Turkish
for ‘civilization’) has united radical reformers and religious conservatives. The
article analyses how these succeeding imperial and republican elites under-
stood the concept of civilization, how they transformed it into a specific
Ottoman and Turkish civilizing mission, and how they approached those
groups of the population who were regarded as ‘backward’ and ‘uncivilized’.
Thereby medeniyet has maintained its dominance until today, making ‘civili-
zation’ the most influential ideological concept of modern Turkish history
besides the idea of the nation.
Keywords: AKP, civilization, civilizing mission, Ottoman Empire, Turkey
While Black Turks listen in general to arabesk and folk music, White Turks prefer Western
music and Turkish Pop. … For their entertainment Black Turks have a barbecue, prepare
ciğ köfte [spicy balls made from bulgur and raw minced meat], and have a picnic; White
Turks play tennis or squash or go skiing. In a taxi Black Turks prefer to sit on the front
seat, while White Turks favour the back seat. Black Turks meet their future partner
generally in a tailor’s shop for ready-made clothes, among their neighbours or at a
wedding, and their marriages are arranged with the help of a matchmaker [görücü
usulü]. White Turks marry the partner they met at a ball, in a night club or at a party.
You can see typical examples of Black Turks rather in coach terminals, typical examples of
White Turks rather in airports. The most striking difference between both is, however, that
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the ‘whites’ express their identity in wearing bow ties, the ‘blacks’ in moving and turning
prayer beads between their fingers.1
Though it presents them in a humorous manner, the above quote from a book on
the achievement of ‘Turkish-style success’ reproduces and confirms the clichés
regarding the life-style, cultural practices and attitude towards religion of so-
called ‘black Turks’ and ‘white Turks’.
The stereotypical ascriptions siyah Türk (‘black Turk’) and beyaz Türk (‘white
Turk’) emerged in the 1990s, when members of the urban secular establishment
in Turkey began to use these terms in order to distinguish themselves from
social groups having a rural background and a religious outlook. In this view the
city-based ‘white Turks’ appear as ‘modern’, ‘educated’ and ‘cultured’, while the
‘black Turks’ from Anatolia are depicted as ‘primitive’, ‘underdeveloped’ and
‘parochial’. Politically the label ‘white Turk’ was also applied to members of the
Kemalist bureaucratic-military elite, the label ‘black Turk’ to supporters of the
Islamic political movement, which increased its influence in those years and
later merged into the successful Justice and Development Party AKP.
In the Turkish public today the terms ‘black Turks’ and ‘white Turks’ are
widely disapproved of due to their openly discriminatory character.2 Nevertheless,
they continue to be used informally, and on occasion Turkish politicians or
domestic and international media refer to them to illustrate social distinctions
in Turkish society.3 One of most frequent users is AKP co-founder and current
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who repeatedly mentioned his status as
siyah Türk or even zenci Türk (‘negro Turk’) in order to characterize his and his
party’s claim to power as a necessary emancipation of ordinary people from beyaz
Türk supremacy and arrogance.4
Academic research has approached the emergence of the ‘black Turks’/
‘white Turks’ dichotomy from several viewpoints:
1 Sekman 2000: 269–270.
2 In 2005, for example, Turkish journalist Mine G. Kırıkkanat lost her job as a columnist at the
liberal daily Radikal following an article in which she described the barbecue habits of migrants
from rural Anatolia in an extremely offensive language (Demiralp 2012: 516–517).
3 In 2013, for instance, the German magazine Der Spiegel published its bilingual German-
Turkish analysis of the Gezi protests in Istanbul under the title “White Turks, black Turks”
(“Weiße Türken, schwarze Türken – Beyaz Türkler, siyah Türkler”, Der Spiegel 24/06/2013,
78–93).
4 During an official Ramadan dinner at the presidential palace in June 2015 Erdoğan said that
“they [the white Turks] call you and us zenci Türk [‘negro Turk’], and I am proud of being a zenci
Türk” (“Cumhurbaşkanı Recep Tayyip Erdoğan'dan iftar sofrası açıklaması”, Hürriyet 24/06/
2015. http://hurarsiv.hurriyet.com.tr/goster/printnews.aspx?DocID=29372616 [27/01/2016]). For
Erdoğan’s use of the terms siyah Türk and zenci Türk see also Ferguson 2014: 78–80.
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– Post-1980 urbanization processes during which former squatter settlements
(gecekondu) developed into more formalized suburbs (varoş), leading to a
more visible presence of rural migrants in Turkish cities.5
– The formation of a new transnational (global and European) bourgeois class
identity among the Turkish urban middle classes as a result of the neolib-
eral economic reforms of the 1980s, Turkey’s growing integration into
capitalist globalization, and intensified ambitions to join the European
Union.6
– Unsolved centre-periphery and majority-minority conflicts beneath the state
ideology of national homogeneity as well as an increasing polarization
between secularism and Islamism in the 1990s, disguising a power struggle
between the Kemalist establishment and ascending provincial actors (repre-
sented by Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party) as well as their com-
peting claims to modernity.7
– A widespread ignorance of the role of race in the formation of Turkish
national identity and of the legacy of Ottoman slavery, which manifests
itself in in the presumption of Turkish ‘whiteness’ and African or Arab
‘darkness’ (in particular when it comes to the use of the word zenci as in
zenci Türk).8
In this sense the ‘black Turks’/‘white Turks’ distinction proves to be the creation
of a long-established urban elite which believed in its entitlement to the
resources of the state and sought recognition of its bourgeois identity in a
world shaped by globalization and EU integration. Challenged through demo-
graphic change and the rise of a rivalling elite in the periphery, this elite reacted
by creating an exclusivist class identity which kept newcomers and competitors
at bay in racist terms.
This article puts the attitude of the self-declared ‘white Turks’ of the 1990s
and 2000s in a broader historical and conceptual context. A sense of natural
superiority, contempt for the ‘backward’ and mistrust in the ‘masses’ has a
long tradition among the dominant strata of Turkish society. It shaped the
5 Sumer 2003.
6 Arat-Koç 2007.
7 Bilici 2009; Demiralp 2012.
8 Ergin 2008; Ferguson 2014. The latter author also discusses the meaning of the word zenci,
which is not the exact equivalent of the English ‘negro’. Zenci includes both connotations of a
more neutral ‘black’ and an openly derogatory ‘negro’. Nevertheless the word is deeply rooted
in the history of Ottoman slavery (Ferguson 2014: 80–84).
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world view of all Ottoman and Turkish elites from the beginning of moderniz-
ing efforts in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. This includes
the AKP elite, which once rose from the ranks of the perceived ‘black Turks’
and has now replaced the ‘white Turks’ at the top of the state.
It is the aim of this contribution to link the world view of the country’s past
and present elites to a key concept: The concept of civilization. Since the
emergence of the French idea of civilisation in the late eighteenth century the
concept of civilization had a profound impact on many societies, among them
imperial Ottoman society and later republican Turkish society. The Ottoman/
Turkish case, however, is special for three reasons:
First, the amplitude of the concept. The reference to civilization is one of the
central elements of political and intellectual thought in the late Ottoman Empire
and the Turkish Republic. Since the first half of the nineteenth century, the
desire to be recognized as civilized has moulded the thinking of Ottoman and
Turkish elites regardless of their political orientation. This pursuit of medeniyet
(or in modern Turkish uygarlık, a term less often used) has united radical
reformers and religious conservatives, even if their understanding of civilization
might differ substantially.
Second, the persistence of the concept. While in many countries the idea of
civilization has been fundamentally questioned (above all due to its complicity
in colonialism), the Turkish version of medeniyet has maintained its rather
unchallenged dominance until today. I therefore argue that ‘civilization’ is,
besides the idea of the nation, the most influential ideological concept of late
Ottoman and republican Turkish history.
Finally, the missionary nature of the concept. Most studies exploring an
Ottoman/Turkish civilizing mission have focussed on Ottoman colonialism,
centralization efforts, or Kemalist assimilationism and secularism. I suggest a
broader perspective based on Jürgen Osterhammel’s definition of the civilizing
mission (see next section): In this sense Ottoman and Turkish elites have
always perceived the concept of civilization as a project of “collective self-
civilization”9 in order to achieve full membership to the club of ‘civilized’
nations, with an inherent mission to civilize unwilling or resisting elements
within. The missionary impetus to enlighten and to discipline ‘backward’ or
‘ignorant’ groups of the population did not end with the Kemalist regime of the
early Turkish Republic. It has driven the ruling Turkish elites ever since,
including the present leadership of the Justice and Development Party.
9 Osterhammel 2005: 391.
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This article thus undertakes a conceptual enquiry into the history of the
Ottoman/Turkish concept of civilization. Informed through the history of con-
cepts (Begriffsgeschichte),10 it investigates how ‘civilization’ was perceived, inter-
preted and negotiated by the succeeding elites at different historical stages and
how the concept was embedded in broader discursive fields like colonialism and
nationalism.
Hence, the analysis follows the development of the concept of medeniyet
from an overall accepted lodestar of modernization to a discursive weapon
used to brand social deviants or political opponents. It discusses the colonial
setting of the adaption of ‘civilization’, the emergence of a domestic version
of the civilizing mission, and the transformation of the concept of medeniyet
under the impact of nationalism and scientific race theories. The second part
of the article focusses on the rather unexplored history of the Turkish civili-
zation concept in the post-World War II period. It investigates how – as a
result of the pluralization of the Turkish political landscape – competing
political actors appropriated the concept of civilization for their own ends.
This process culminated in the term ‘civilization’ becoming one of the favour-
ite political catchwords of the AKP government, which uses references to
medeniyet to justify its ambitious reconstruction of Turkish society, to
denounce political adversaries, and to advocate the expansion of Turkey’s
influence beyond its borders.
The origins of the concept of civilization
The French term civilisation in its modern sense developed among mid-eight-
eenth century French philosophers of the Enlightenment. Based on terms
derived from the Latin word civis (‘citizen’), ‘civilisation’ also spread in other
European languages and soon became one of the central philosophical concepts
of the modern era.11
The concept of civilization includes several aspects. In a collective sense the
term describes a higher developed state of human society regarding moral
standards and lifestyle as well as scientific and technological progress.
Individually understood as ‘the condition of being civilized’, the term refers to
10 For the essentials of the history of concepts (Begriffsgeschichte) see Koselleck 2006; for the
application of this field of research to contemporary history see e. g. Steinmetz 2011; Kollmeier/
Hoffmann 2010.
11 Fisch 2004: 716–720.
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a higher developed state of a person marked through characteristics and values
like decency, self-discipline, virtue, tact, courtesy, refinement or the apprecia-
tion of art and education. The concept also covers the process of ‘becoming
civilized’ whose starting point is located in a natural state. ‘Civilization’ is
demarcated through antonyms like barbarian, primitive, savage, undeveloped
or underdeveloped – or simply uncivilized.12
The history of the civilization concept was always accompanied by its
criticism. The critique of civilization idealized an imagined unspoiled natural
state or romanticized the so-called ‘noble savage’, untainted by the influences of
a corrupt or decadent modern civilization.13
In German-speaking countries, on the other hand, the development of the
civilization concept took a separate path. Referring more narrowly to scientific
and technological achievements, Zivilisation was contrasted with Kultur, a term
that conveyed intellectual, religious and moral aspects and was increasingly
used to demarcate national differences.14
Later the concept underwent a certain pluralization. ‘Civilization’ in the
singular understood as a potentially universal human condition was widened –
and in a certain way challenged – through the division of the world into several
‘civilizations’ in the plural.15
A fundamental element of the concept of civilization is a firm belief in
progress. Initially ‘becoming civilized’ was regarded as a natural process of
maturation during which the primitives could once reach the state of being
civilized. The idea of a ‘hierarchy of civilization’ emerging in the first half of
the nineteenth century formalized this process in scientific terms. Thereby each
people of the world could be classified according its perceived degree of civili-
zation on this scale ranging from primitive peoples or barbarian peoples to
civilized peoples, with Europeans at the top.16
The emergence of the civilizing mission
In the late nineteenth century the evolutionist perspective changed together with
an increasingly interventionist role of the state and an ethnologization of the
civilization concept as result of intensifying colonial expansion in the age of
12 Graf 2008: 1888–1889.
13 Graf 2008: 1890.
14 Fisch 2004: 722–730.
15 Fisch 2004: 718, 757–758.
16 Fisch 2004: 743.
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New Imperialism.17 This more active approach generated the idea of a ‘civilizing
mission’ by Europeans or North Americans. The term mission civilisatrice itself
was first used in France in the 1870s and then adopted by other imperialist
powers.18 According to Jürgen Osterhammel this idea implies, on the one hand,
both the right and the obligation to advance the process of progress in the name
of civilization. In a more limited sense it means, on the other hand, the necessity
of active interventions in order to secure minimum standards of civilization in
acute times of crisis.19
Osterhammel regards civilizing missions as projects of elites that were not
restricted to European or North American colonial empires.20 Civilizing missions
could also cover efforts to ‘civilize’ domestic peasants or revolutionaries, inter-
ventions to remove despotic regimes or to establish a beneficial peaceful order
(increasingly with reference to international law), or campaigns in the name of
humanitarianism.21 Osterhammel puts particular emphasis on what he calls
“self-civilizing” projects: Such projects were often implemented by the elites of
non-European countries (above all in the Ottoman Empire, in Latin America, in
Egypt, in Japan and later in China). Motivated by the perception of inferiority on
the hierarchy of civilization or the threat of being colonized by foreign powers,
the elites of these countries decided to ‘civilize’ themselves and their population
according to Western models.22
Elites, the state, and the Ottoman/Turkish
‘self-civilizing’ project
While thus elites appear as the principal actors in civilizing and self-civilizing
projects, the term ‘elite’ itself needs some further clarification in this context.
Sociological theories of elites offer a wide range of definitions of the term, which
could be condensed to certain elements: Elites are social minorities consisting of
persons that have achieved their status through some kind of selection process.
They are ascribed (or ascribe to themselves) an outstanding or exclusive position
in the functioning of society and have privileged access to the resources of
17 Osterhammel 2005: 366–367.
18 Schaebler 2004: 8.
19 Osterhammel 2005: 363.
20 Osterhammel 2005: 370.
21 Osterhammel 2005: 366–368; 389–390; 400–408.
22 Osterhammel 2005: 390–392.
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(political, economic, and other forms of) power.23 It is debated if there is one
singular elite or if there are several elites in societies. More recent research tends
to distinguish elites in different social fields (political system, economy, higher
education, religion, media, etc.), which could be nevertheless closely inter-
twined, to the point of forming a ruling class.24
What is important in the Ottoman/Turkish context is the extremely close
association of the elites with the state. In the late Ottoman Empire and the
Turkish Republic power depended (and still depends) to a large extent on
proximity to the state, thus for a long time the dominant elites emerged primar-
ily from the state apparatus (in particular from the bureaucracy and the mili-
tary). This close relationship could be traced back to the Ottoman ‘self-civilizing’
effort. From the nineteenth century onwards the state has been at the centre of
all efforts of the elites to achieve civilization. Karpat emphasizes that in this
period “assuring the survival and supremacy of devlet baba (the father or mother
state) acquired undisputed priority and legitimacy as the instrument of civiliza-
tion (that is, modernization)”.25 In this logic the overall aim of civilization
required that the ruling elites lay exclusive claim on the state resources: “[T]he
bureaucracy intelligentsia – included the military – became [the] supreme and
exclusive agent [of civilization] and used it to legitimize their political supre-
macy and absolutism”.26 As a consequence, any group that emerged as rivalling
elite strived to take over the state together with its civilizing mission, as it is
demonstrated further below.
The concept of medeniyet in the late
Ottoman Empire
In the Ottoman Empire, the adaption of the concept of civilization took place in
the context of a radical modernization effort. In the first half of the nineteenth
century, the Ottoman elites initiated numerous reforms to modernize centuries-
old institutions (beginning with the military) and to save the Empire from
foreign domination. The concept of civilization, as it was understood in its
early phase, provided the elites with a vision on which the desired transforma-
tion of the state could be based: The vision of becoming part of a universal
23 Wasner 2004: 16–17.
24 Hartmann 2004: 103–105.
25 Karpat 2001: 11.
26 Karpat 2001: 11–12.
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civilization open to all peoples and nations if they followed the example of the
civilized states in Western Europe and Northern America.
The term ‘civilization’ was included into Ottoman language when after 1826
more and more Ottoman diplomats and officials served in Western Europe.27
According to Tuncer Baykara different Ottoman versions of the term ‘civilization’
circulated in the 1830s and 1840s:
a) sivilizasyon, the equivalent of the French word civilisation that was used in
particular in the 1850s.
b) hazariyet, a word derived from the Arabic word ḥaḍārī (sedentary, settled,
also: civilized) that yet could not gain acceptance.
c) temeddün and medeniyet, two expressions based on the Arabic root mad-
dana, from which the word madīna (town) is derived. Ibn Khaldun used the
Arabic word tamaddun (becoming urbanized or civilized) already in the
fourteenth century. Its Turkish equivalent temeddün, however, did not pre-
vail in the Ottoman context. Based on the Arabic word madanīya, the
neologism medeniyet became instead the customary Ottoman and later
Turkish term for ‘civilization’.28
The Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals who sought a fundamental moder-
nization of the Empire according to Western models yet faced the problem that
the notion of civilization included certain Christian roots. In particular, the
contemporary British idea combined Protestant Christianity with Victorian
values like commercial diligence, free trade, incorruptibility and the rule of
law, moderation, self-restraint and cleanliness.29 Though the successful model
of the dominant British Empire had considerable influence on the Ottoman
reform elite, the French idea of civilisation with <21–38> its less pronounced
religious connotations provided a more suitable ideological basis.30
The Ottoman modernizers of the era of the Tanzimat (‘reforms’) thus purged
their vision of medeniyet of any Christian religious-cultural traces in order to
secure acceptance in a dynastic empire legitimized through Islam.31 Instead,
they propagated ‘civilization’ as a universal, superior lifestyle that was essential
27 Baykara 2007: 34–39.
28 Baykara 2007: 49–55; Schaebler 2004: 16–18. The latter author locates one of the first
elaborated modern discourses on civilization in the journal Mecmua-i Fünun. In the early
1860s the contributors to this intellectual Ottoman journal discussed the concept of civilization
in the terms of medeniyet (Schaebler 2004: 18). For complementary examples of the translation
of ‘civilization’ into Arabic in the mid-nineteenth century see Stephan (2012: ).
29 Osterhammel 2005: 388.
30 Osterhammel 2005: 390.
31 Karpat 2001: 11.
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for the development of Ottoman society. Kemal Karpat describes the Ottoman
understanding of medeniyet accordingly as “a higher level of social order,
morality, refinement, grace, good manners, development (umran), and secure,
comfortable living; and it was the opposite of ignorance, stagnation, passivity,
unproductive existence, and primitiveness”.32
This idea of medeniyet became the key concept of the Ottoman reform
movement and its national ideology, Ottomanism, designed to unite all subjects
of the Sultan as citizens in a modern state. The perception of inferiority to
Western Europe and North America made the Ottoman modernizers embark on
a far-reaching ‘self-civilizing’ project, as it was outlined in the previous sections.
Medeniyet remained the unshaken ideal of the Ottoman elite even when
nationalist ambitions of the Christian communities and imperialist claims under-
mined Ottomanism and its aim of national unity. Yet the debate about how the
universal concept of civilization should be culturally embedded and how it
should be distinguished from Western and Christian interpretations intensified
and became more and more controversial.
The Ottoman civilizing mission
Confronted with growing European imperial aspirations on Ottoman territory,
the elite of the Empire instigated its own version of a civilizing mission. The
Ottoman civilizing mission targeted those who defied the benefits of medeniyet
and remained in ‘backwardness’ and ‘primitivity’. According to Birgit Schäbler
this affected Ottoman imperial subjects in tribal, rural frontier regions who lived
far from the urban centres and their way of life, especially nomadic Arabs,
Turkmens and Kurds.33 Selim Deringil describes how in the late Ottoman
Empire bedeviyet (nomadism) and vahşet or vahşiyet (savagery) emerged as the
main antonyms of medeniyet.34 Maurus Reinkowski adds to these terms the word
cahiliyet (ignorance), the Arabic term for the pre-Islamic period, by which
Ottoman civilizers denoted the ‘uncivilized’ and ‘barbarian’.35
The role of European colonialism and Orientalism in the creation of an
Ottoman colonialism has become part of an intensive scholarly debate.36
A growing number of studies has demonstrated how the Ottoman elite adopted
32 Karpat 2001: 11.
33 Schäbler 2003: 22–27.
34 Deringil 1998: 41.
35 Reinkowski 2005: 249.
36 See, for instance, Makdisi 2002; Deringil 2003; Reinkowski 2006.
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the mind-set of European colonialism and began to view its periphery in colonial
terms from the mid-nineteenth century onwards (covering regions like Lebanon,
North Africa or the Yemen).37 These civilizing efforts even intensified in later
decades when the territorial claims of European powers increasingly threatened
the Empire’s existence.
The following quote illustrates this close connection between colonialism
and the civilization ideal. In 1909, the Young Turk sympathizer and educational
reformer Dr. Hafız Cemal (Lokmanhekim) criticized the ‘backward’ mentality and
‘lack of civilization’ among the Turkish Muslims living in British-occupied
Cyprus:
From the occupation of our island onwards, the British government has granted freedom to
the Turks and the Greeks. … Ninety-five percent of the miserable Turks, however, misused
the idea of ‘freedom’. They have become the slaves of wine, rakı, brothels, pubs, places of
prostitution, in short, of the world of pleasure and amusement. Ruined and pitiful every
other day, they almost know nothing about true civilization. Therefore, we sadly have to
admit that the Turks of the island have even not been able to reach the degree of progress
and development of the Chinese or so. While Europe lives in the year 1909, we are still in
1709 and 200 years behind of their standard of thinking and living.38
The combination of inferiority feelings and a strong claim to equality is typical
of the Ottoman (and later Turkish) civilizing mission. In order to demonstrate
their civilized character to the outside world, the elites distinguished themselves
from those parts of the population that they identified as uncivilized. At the
same time, this differentiation justified modernization schemes from above
through which the elites strived to civilize ‘backward’ elements within.
‘Civilization’ between universalism, nationalism
and racism
In the course of the nineteenth century, a shift in the meaning of civilization
forced the Ottoman modernizers to accentuate their civilizing effort. ‘Civilization’
began to lose its universalistic character, with existing and newly emerging
nation-states laying claim on the term in an exclusivist manner. Already in
37 See, for instance, Makdisi 2000; Herzog/Motika 2000; Kuehn 2011; Palabıyık 2012; Lafi 2015.
38 Dr. Hafız Cemal [Lokmanhekim], Kıbrıs Osmanlılarına mahsus son hediye-i acizanem veyahud
Kıbrısta geçen dört senelik tarih-i hayatım (My last humble present for the Cypriot Ottomans or the
biography of my four years in Cyprus), İslam ve Mirat-ı Zaman Matbaası, Lefkoşa (Nicosia) 1909,
in: Lokmanhekim 2001: 169.
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1838 the French politician and historian François Guizot had narrowed ‘civiliza-
tion’ down to ‘the civilization of Europe’ with France as most-developed nation
at its core.39 In Britain meanwhile the notion of a hierarchy of civilization was
popularized – with the British Empire at its top. From the 1860s onwards this
hierarchy was increasingly theorized by evolutionist scientists on the assump-
tion that all countries and peoples of the world could be compared according
their standard of civilization.40 In the hierarchy of civilization the Ottoman
Empire, perceived as the epitome of an ‘Oriental despotism’, was placed on
the inferior ranks.41 Later this perception became manifest in the persistent
image of the ‘Sick Man of Europe’.42
The national movements in South-East Europe, too, based their demands for
secession from the Ottoman Empire on a superior status of civilization.
Independent Greece (being itself subjected to a civilizing project under a
Bavarian king after its establishment through the European powers) now con-
sidered itself on a civilizing mission towards the Ottoman East. Accordingly,
Greek Prime Minister Ioannis Kolettis explained the national aspiration of the
Megali Idea (‘Great Idea’) in 1844 as follows:
By her geographical location, Greece is the center of Europe; with the East on her right and
the West on her left, she has been destined through her downfall to enlighten the West and
through her regeneration to enlighten the East. The first task has been fulfilled by our
ancestors; the second is assigned to us.43
At the same time, the rising Ottoman Christian elites began to see themselves as
natural representatives of European civilization who were superior to their
‘underdeveloped’ Muslim rulers.44
In connection with ongoing nationalist ambitions of the Christian commu-
nities and increasingly unconcealed imperialist claims, the image of the
Ottoman Empire further deteriorated during the second half of the nineteenth
century. The same period witnessed the rise of scientific race theories. In con-
trast to the civilization concept, which incorporated the possibility of change
and development in order to reach a higher standard, these theories attributed
social and cultural differences biologically to unalterable ‘races’, thereby basi-
cally denying any civilizing option.45
39 Guizot 2004 [1838]: 27.
40 Osterhammel 2005: 388–389.
41 Adanır 2001: 95–96.
42 Ramm 2009: 103.
43 Kitromilides 1979, S. 152.
44 Karpat 2001: 12.
45 Barth 2005: 203; Osterhammel 2005: 420.
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This shift is reflected in the well-known quote from British Prime Minister
William E. Gladstone’s pamphlet Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East,
published in 1876:
Let me endeavor very briefly to sketch, in the rudest outline, what the Turkish race was
and what it is. It’s not a question of Mohametanism simply, but of Mohametanism
compounded with the peculiar character of a race. They are not the mild Mohametans of
India, nor the chivalrous Saladins of Syria, nor the cultured Moors of Spain. They were,
upon the whole, from the black day when they first entered Europe, the one great anti-
human specimen of humanity. Wherever they went, a broad line of blood marked the track
behind them; and, as far as their dominion reached, civilization vanished from view.46
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth century the image of an inferior and
blood-thirsty ‘Turkish race’ that could not be civilized served as popular justifi-
cation for interventions by European powers into Ottoman affairs and annexa-
tions of territory from a debt- and conflict-ridden Empire.
Medeniyet, Islam and Ottoman nationalism
With their desire to become accepted as a civilized country having clearly failed,
the Ottoman elites reacted with an ideological split that is mirrored in the two
political ideas that have been most influential in Turkish political discourse until
today – the nation and civilization. On the one hand, the elites stuck to the ideal
of a universalistic civilization. Only the achievement of ‘civilization’ in the
singular could revive the Empire’s power and thereby secure its well-deserved
recognition as member of the club of the civilized. On the other hand, they
rejected superficial Westernization and emphasized a culturally unique Ottoman
path to this universal civilization, a task assigned to an Ottoman imperial
nationalism that was later enriched with Islamic and Turkish components.
Though Ottoman intellectuals closely followed Western scientific and phi-
losophical trends of the era, this ideological split was rarely as theoretically
elaborated as it was the case with the German differentiation between
Zivilisation and Kultur (an exception was Ziya Gökalp’s approach to civilization
which is referred to further below). In addition, it was blurred through the
notion of multiple ‘civilizations’ which emerged in that period. In the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century thus references to ‘our civilization’ increased.
It was not unusual that the mention of ‘civilizations’ in the plural appeared side
by side with references to universal ‘civilization’ in the singular – a phenomenon
46 Gladstone 1876: S.10.
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that can also be observed in contemporary Turkey (see in particular the section
on the AKP).
In the 1860s, the Young Ottomans were among the first who advocated a
separate path the Ottoman nation should pursue to achieve civilization.
According to the members of this intellectual-political movement, the Ottoman
modernization project should be based on the nation’s own cultural and reli-
gious foundations instead of merely copying Western culture. In particular
Namık Kemal claimed that European civilization rested on many institutions
that were initially Islamic and had only later been perfected by Europeans.47
Kemal’s writings contained a strong emphasis on these Islamic roots:
If you consider it civilization when women go on the street indecently dressed [açık saçık]
or dance at gatherings, this is against our moral standards. We do not want that, not a
thousand times! Thanks to religion we are a nation that has conquered three large
continents of the world starting from two small towns in the Hejaz. Regarding knowledge
and bravery we got ahead of the Greeks and the Romans.48
The ideological split between the aim of achieving universal civilization and the
insistence on a culturally genuine and religiously compatible way of moderniz-
ing the state (increasingly understood as project of national modernization)
transcended the growing factionalization among the Ottoman elites. While in
the second half of the nineteenth century the debate became more and more
polarized between conservatives and Islamists on one side and modernists and
radical Westernizers on the other, the concept of civilization itself shaped the
rational and worldly outlook of Ottoman bureaucrats and intellectuals regard-
less of their political stance, as Kemal Karpat states: “By the time the nature,
scope, and origin of civilization – whether it was materialistic, Western, and/or
Christian, created or borrowed – became subject to debate, the idea itself had
been largely accepted and incorporated into the elites’ culture.”49 As part of the
Ottoman understanding of medeniyet this author also notes a changing percep-
tion of Islam, which was increasingly combined with worldly notions and open-
ness to enlightenment and progress.50
Hence, the dividing line between conservatives and modernists was less
clear than often perceived. Sultan Abdülhamid II, who ruled the empire in an
absolutist fashion after the suspension of the Ottoman constitution in 1878,
expressed his opinion on civilization in his memoirs: “What is beneficial to us
47 Mardin 2000: 322.
48 Namık Kemal: “Fırkamız meydana çıktı çıkalı”, Hürriyet 07/09/1868, 7.
49 Karpat 2001: 410.
50 Karpat 2001: 410.
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is not to imitate the so called European civilization but return to the şeriat
[sharia], the source of our strength.”51 Such remarks could be seen as a proof
of Abdülhamid’s Islamist convictions. Yet his ambitious continuation and
expansion of the Ottoman modernization project reveal to what extent the sultan
had internalized the concept of civilization, even if he gave it a stronger Islamic
touch. Authors like Karpat argue that Abdülhamid’s approach towards Islam
included a progressive perception of religion and that he used Islamism as
modern political ideology.52 As part of his centralization policy the sultan
pursued the Ottoman civilizing mission and colonizing efforts more
systematically.53
In contrast to their adversary Abdülhamid the Young Turks have an image of
staunch Westernizers. Many members of the movement which would start the
successful constitutional revolution of 1908 were convinced that Western civili-
zation was the one and only and equivalent to ‘contemporary science’.54 At the
same time they were dedicated Ottoman patriots in the tradition of the Young
Ottomans. Their stance to Islam was ambivalent: Though members like
Abdullah Cevdet, an important theorist among the early Young Turks, saw
religion as an impediment to progress, Ahmet Rıza, a committed positivist and
early leader of the movement, made many references to Islam in his writings.55
Driven by a vigorous desire to preserve the unity of the empire at any cost,
the Young Turks combined the concept of civilization with an extremely elitist
perception of the ordinary population, the ‘masses’.56 Influenced by popular
Western race theories, their pronounced elitism mixed with emerging Ottoman-
Muslim and later Turkish nationalism and contained a strong social Darwinist
notion.57 In this sense, the achievement of civilization became an issue of the
‘survival of the fittest’. Abdullah Cevdet expressed it once as follows:
Modern civilization does not have any pity on those who are not civilized. The law of
evolution is a law without compassion and understanding. It condemns to oblivion the
weak, the ignorant and the incompetent.58
51 Sultan Abdülhamit: Siyasî Hâtıratım. Hrsg. von İsmet Bozdağ. Istanbul: Dergâh Yayınları
1974, 157. In: Karpat 2001: 162.
52 Karpat 2001: 174.
53 Deringil 2003: 318–324.
54 Hanioğlu 1995: 17–18.
55 Mardin 1969: 10–14.
56 This elitism was notably influenced by French sociologist Gustave Le Bon and his theories
on ‘crowds’ (Hanioğlu 1995: 22).
57 Hanioğlu 1995: 22, 208–209.
58 A[bdullah] C[evdet]: “Fas Hükumet-i İslamiyesinin Inkırazı”, İçtihad, April 1905. In: Mardin
1969: 15.
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This radical interpretation of civilization had a profound impact on the policy of
the Young Turks until 1918. Elitism and social Darwinism coloured their centra-
lization efforts, their increasingly uncompromising attitude towards any political
opposition, their seizure of absolute power in 1913, and their decision to anni-
hilate the Ottoman Armenian community during the First World War.
After the war a more sophisticated theoretical approach to civilization was
elaborated by Ziya Gökalp, a leading Young Turk ideologue and one of the
originators of Turkish nationalism. The sociologist offered one of the most
pronounced examples of the ideological separation between national culture
and supranational civilization. His civilization concept differentiated between
hars, the invariable culture of a nation, and medeniyet, larger international
collectives a nation could change and thus participate in the technological
and scientific achievements of Western civilization.59
The Kemalist civilizing mission
Continuing the elitist outlook of the Young Turks, the founders of the Turkish
Republic implemented their own version of a civilizing mission in order to
convince the populace of the benefits of secularism and Turkish nationalism.
Mustafa Kemal, being himself a member of the Young Turk movement in late
Ottoman Empire, stood in the scientistic tradition of those radical Ottoman
Westernizers who recognized only one singular civilization. His approach dif-
fered from that of Gökalp, who had included Islam as a unifying element in his
vision of Turkish culture. In Kemal’s view civilization contained different cul-
tures, but it took its shape from Western European cultures as the most
advanced. Therefore elements of domestic culture which were not compatible
with universal civilization had to be adjusted or eradicated.60
This concerned in particular Islam. After the establishment of the Republic
in 1923, Mustafa Kemal sought to bring the Islamic religion under the control of
the state, with the ultimate aim of confining it to the private realm. When the
Sufi orders (tarikat) and dervish lodges (tekke) were banned in 1925, Kemal
declared:
In view of the enlightenment of science, technology, and civilization in its entirety, I will
never accept the presence of individuals in the civilized society of Turkey who are so
59 Gökalp 1976: 25–26.
60 Hanioğlu 2011: 203–204.
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primitive that they are looking for material and spiritual felicity under the guidance of
such-and-such a sheikh.
Gentlemen and the nation, you all should know well that the Republic of Turkey cannot be
the homeland of sheiks, dervishes, disciples and members [of religious orders]. The truest
tarikat is the tarikat of civilization. To do what civilization requires is enough to be a
human being.61
The words muasır (contemporary, modern) and medenî (civilized), already part
of the Ottoman concept of civilization, became the central terms of Mustafa
Kemal’s speeches, occurring even more than references to national identity.62
The whole Kemalist modernization project was embedded in a discourse of
civilization that branded its adversaries as ignorant, backward, uncivilized,
reactionary or fanatic. The following passage of Kemal’s 36-hour-speech before
the congress of the Republican People’s Party CHP in 1927, in which he
explained the ‘Hat Law’ prohibiting the fez, is emblematic in this respect:
Gentlemen, it was necessary to abolish the fez, which sat on our heads as a sign of
ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred to progress and civilisation, and to adopt in its place
the hat, the customary head-dress of the whole civilised world, thus showing, among other
things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and
the whole family of civilised mankind.63
Kemal thereby managed to transform the image of the fez, which had become
the headgear of the modern Ottoman gentleman in the Tanzimat era, into a
symbol of ‘reactionary’ behaviour.
The secularization and assimilation campaigns of the early Republic marked
the culmination of a civilizing mission that was now delineated in ethno-nation-
alist terms as ‘Turkish’. The Kemalist civilizing effort widened its scope from
nomadic and rural populations – the main target of the Ottoman civilizing
mission – to true or alleged religious traditionalists as well as non-Turkish
ethnic groups, in particular the Kurds.64 Going far beyond their Ottoman pre-
decessors, the Kemalist civilizers aimed at erasing any ethnic-cultural identity
other than Turkish and any form of religious consciousness beyond the official
version of Sunni Islam prescribed by the Presidency of Religious Affairs.
The civilizing mission of the nationalist and secularist republican elite created
frictions that still trouble Turkish society today. The underlying concept of
61 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: “Kastamonu‘da İkinci Bir Konuşma”, 30/08/1925, in: Ankara
Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü 2006: 223.
62 Zürcher 2000: 177.
63 Kemal 1929: 721–722.
64 For the assimilation campaigns against non-Turkish groups see, for instance, Üngör 2011.
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civilization, however, was made one of the central pillars of the state ideology,
even if it was not one of the six official principles of Kemalism.65 This process
was so effective that all relevant Turkish political actors in the post-Atatürk era
adopted the phrase of muasır medeniyet – contemporary civilization – (or, more
rarely, the neologism çağdaş uygarlık), as it is shown further below.
The success of the Kemalist concept of ‘contemporary civilization’ rooted
in a semantic manoeuver. Mustafa Kemal not only split the overall aim of
universal civilization from a Turkish-national way to achieve this aim.
Moreover, he forged ‘civilization’ into the master narrative of the Turkish
nation. Consequently ‘being civilized’ appeared as a feature that was already
inherent in the national character of the Turks and had only to be revived in
order to bring the nation back at the top of the most civilized countries. This
notion coloured Kemal’s often-cited speech delivered for the 10th Anniversary
of the Republic of Turkey in 1933, which culminated in the famous nationalist
motto “How happy is the one who can say ‘I am a Turk’!” (“Ne mutlu Türküm
diyene!”). Similarly the phrase “We shall raise our national culture above the
level of contemporary civilization” (“Millî kültürümüzü muasır medeniyet
seviyesinin üstüne çıkaracağız”) would become the creed of Kemalist belief
in the ideal of civilization:
We shall raise our homeland to the level of the most prosperous and civilized countries of
the world. We shall provide our nation with the broadest means and sources of welfare. We
shall raise our national culture above the level of contemporary civilization. […]
Today I declare with the same faith and determination that the entire civilized world will
soon acknowledge once again that the Turkish nation, which is marching towards the
national ideal in full unison, is a great nation. I have never doubted that the once forgotten
great civilized characteristic and great civilized talent of Turkishness will, with its subse-
quent flourishing, rise like a new sun from future’s high horizon of civilization.66
In the 1930s, amidst the rising influence of anthropological race theories on
Turkish nationalism, the fusion of civilization and the nation was carried to
extremes. The Turkish history thesis, officially propagated until Atatürk’s death
in 1938, claimed that the cradle of civilization was Central Asia, where the Turks
created ‘world civilization’ and spread it over the globe.67
65 The six principles of Kemalism – or ‘Six Arrows’ (Altı Ok) – are Republicanism
(Cumhuriyetçilik), Populism (Halkçılık), Nationalism (Milliyetçilik), Secularism (Laiklik), Statism
(Devletçilik), and Revolutionary Reformism (Devrimcilik).
66 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk: “Onuncu Yıl Nutku”, 29/10/1933. In: Ankara Üniversitesi Türk
İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü 2006: 318.
67 Hanioğlu 2011: 164–165.
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The Turkish concept of civilization in the second
half of the twentieth century
After the First World War, the concept of civilization began to lose its lustre in
many Western European countries and was increasingly questioned by intellec-
tuals. This process was furthered through the experience of the Second World
War with the unprecedented Nazi politics of mass extermination and later
intensified during post-war decolonization.
Turkey, however, remained unaffected. The Turkish elites’ adherence to the
civilization ideal survived the Second World War and the Kemalist one-party-
state. Since 1945, both elected governments and the authoritarian regimes that
seized power after military coups have tried to transform and to control Turkish
society according to their respective idea of civilization. Moreover, political
parties from the right to the left grounded their programmes on the vision of a
truly civilized Turkey.
The conservative Democrat Party DP that came to power at the 1950 elec-
tions initially displayed a more cautious approach to Westernization. In its 1946
programme, it referred to the Kemalist principles, but did not mention the
phrase ‘contemporary civilization’. It only promised “to bring the Turkish nation
in every sense to an advanced level and to eradicate in any area backward and
dangerous traditions stemming from the past”.68
Nevertheless, DP-Prime Minister Adnan Menderes made many references to
civilization during his term in office. In 1951, for instance, he promised “to raise the
country to a level oriented towards Western civilization” and “to bring the Turkish
peasant by every means […] to the level of prosperous and civilized people”.69
In 1960, a Kemalist-inspired military coup removed Menderes and the DP
from power. The relatively liberal constitution of 1961 laid down in Article 153
that the Kemalist reform laws providing for secularism and the achievement of
the level of ‘contemporary civilization’ (among them the ‘Hat Law’ of 1925) were
exempt from any changes:
No Provision of this Constitution shall be construed or interpreted as rendering unconsti-
tutional the following Reform Laws which aim at raising the Turkish society to the level of
contemporary civilization and at safeguarding the secular character of the Republic […].70
68 Programme of the Demokrat Parti DP, 1946, 4.
69 “Demokrat Partinin büyük kongresi”, Milliyet 16/10/1951, 1.
70 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, Resmi Gazete 20/07/1961, 4653. Translation in: Constitution
of the Turkish Republic. Translated by Sadik Balkan, Ahmet E, Uysal and Kemal H. Karpat.
Ankara 1961, 43. http://www.anayasa.gen.tr/1961constitution-text.pdf (19.02.16).
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Instead of the older muasır medeniyet the framers of the constitution chose the
neologism çağdaş uygarlık for ‘contemporary civilization’, both words being
products of the Kemalist language reform of the 1930s.
The ensuing pluralization of the political landscape saw the emergence of
many new parties which differed on ideological issues but all adhered to the
concept of civilization. The mainstream parties, the centre-left Republican
People’s Party CHP and the centre-right Justice Party AP, both pledged to
bring Turkey on the level of ‘contemporary civilization’.71 Linguistically the
party programmes of the era varied only in one aspect: In general the parties
on the left – which in those years strongly identified with high Kemalism –
showed a tendency to use uygarlık for ‘civilization’, while those of the political
right preferred medeniyet.
Accordingly, the Workers Party of Turkey TİP – the first socialist party
elected to the Turkish parliament – emphasized çağdaş uygarlık in its pro-
gramme. The party claimed that the achievement of the level of contemporary
civilization depended on economic growth and social participation of the work-
ing classes: “The economic basis which the ruling classes want to preserve and
to sustain […] definitely prevents Turkey from achieving progress and reaching
rapidly the level of contemporary civilization”.72
For the emerging parties on the far-right, medeniyet served equally as an
important reference point. The Republican Peasants’ Nation Party CKMP, a
predecessor of the Nationalist Movement Party MHP and the extreme nationalist
Ülkücü (‘Idealist’) movement, stated in its 1965 programme: “Our aim is to
participate constructively in the common civilization of modern humankind”.73
CKMP- and later MHP-leader Alparslan Türkeş advocated that Turkey should
become “the most civilized nation”, as in the following quote of 1967: “Idealism
[means] the ideal of transforming Turkey into the most advanced, most civilized
and most powerful entity”.74
A peculiar understanding of civilization was displayed by the National Order
Party MNP. The first in the long chain of Islamist parties founded by the Millî
Görüş (‘National View’) movement of Necmettin Erbakan did not content itself
with a civilization on equal terms: “Our Party acknowledges that our Nation will
71 Election manifesto of the Adalet Parti AP, 1961; programme of the AP, 1964; election
manifesto of the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi CHP, 1965; programme of the CHP, 1969.
72 Programme of the Türkiye İşçi Partisi TİP, Istanbul 1964, 59.
73 Programme of the Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi CKMP, Ankara 1965, 5.
74 Alparslan Türkeş in a speech before the 1967 congress of the CKMP about the principles of
the ‘9 Lights’ (9 Işık), cited on hurriyet.com.tr, http://dosyalar.hurriyet.com.tr/hur/mhp/mhp5.
htm (accessed 15/05/2014).
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[….] establish a superior civilization as an example to the world […]”.75 A
remarkable aspect of the National Order Party’s notion of civilization is the
strong emphasis on knowledge and technology:
It is our aim to educate the new generations in a way making them believing, diligent,
patriotic, tied to national morality, family order and family discipline, endowed with our
national ideal, our culture and our historical consciousness, righteous, selfless, devoted,
with the determination to reach in the competition for knowledge, technology and civiliza-
tion a level that may light the world the way.”76
In the late 1960s and in the 1970s growing political polarization and civil war-
like conflicts shook Turkey. In addition, the Turkish army staged coups against
the elected governments in 1971 and in 1980. The military junta that choked any
remaining forms of pluralism after the 1980 coup also operated with the civiliza-
tion ideal, yet mostly a very traditional one. In 1981, General Kenan Evren
justified the coup that was organized under his leadership in referring to the
role of the Turkish youth:
Once you had your doubts about the Turkish youth, but after cleaning some microbes that
infiltrated these young people now you stand in front of an unblemished Turkish youth. …
In your hands this Turkey, this fatherland will rise even more and reach the level of
contemporary civilization.77
Evren even went beyond this classic Kemalist approach to civilization when he
praised the role of Islam on another occasion: “The source of Islam, the world’s
most perfect religion of reason and science, is human kindness and civiliza-
tion.”78 There he followed the doctrine of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis by which
the military regime tried to marginalize the once powerful political left.
The constitution of 1982, which bore the authoritarian mark of the military,
reiterated in Article 174 the provisions of the 1961 document safeguarding the
essential Kemalist reform laws.79 In its preamble, it stated:
Determining to attain the everlasting existence, prosperity, material and spiritual well-
being of the Republic of Turkey, and the standards of contemporary civilization as an
honourable member with equal rights of the family of world nations […]80
75 Programme of the Milli Nizam Partisi MNP, Istanbul 1970, 5.
76 Programme of the Milli Nizam Partisi MNP, Istanbul 1970, 12–13.
77 “Evren: ‘Tek Yol Atatürk Yoludur’”, Milliyet 20/05/1981, 14.
78 “Evren: ‘Milletçe Bir Ve Beraber Oldukça Aşamayacağımız Engel Yoktur’”, Milliyet 01/08/
1981, 14.
79 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, Resmi Gazete 09/11/1982, 51.
80 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Anayasası, Resmi Gazete 09/11/1982, 1. Translation in: Constitution of
the Republic of Turkey 1982, 1. https://global.tbmm.gov.tr/docs/constitution_en.pdf (19.02.16).
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Towards the end of the twentieth century, the promise to reach ‘the level of
contemporary civilization’ had mostly become a rhetorical formula through
which politicians or political parties expressed their adherence to Kemalism or
their commitment to modernization. The civilization ideal played a certain role
in the conflict between the Kemalist bureaucratic-military establishment and the
ascending Islamist Welfare Party RP, which was branded as irticacı (reactionary)
in the establishment’s parlance.81 Nevertheless the ‘contemporary civilization’
formula had lost much of the visionary and mobilizing force it had in the earlier
decades of the Republic. As discussed at the beginning of this article, the debate
about who was civilized and who was not shifted increasingly to the social
sphere – disguised in the ascriptions ‘white Turks’ and ‘black Turks’. The
exclusionary character of this distinction reflected a significant erosion of the
missionary character of the Kemalist project. Instead, some of the self-declared
‘white Turks’ advocated forms of class-based segregation of the urban bourgeoi-
sie and the ‘black Turk’ masses from the countryside, who ‘invaded’ the social
space of the city’s upper and middle classes.82
Meanwhile the idea of civilization received some attention in its plural.
References to ‘civilizations’ had always occurred from time to time, in particular
to emphasize the uniqueness of the nation’s history. In this sense, the far-right
Nationalist Working Party MÇP, a placeholder for the temporarily banned MHP,
referred in its 1988 programme to “the Great Turkish nation which had estab-
lished high civilizations”.83
In the 1990s, however, non-establishment actors like the Kurdish and the
Islamist movement used references to the heritage of ‘civilizations’ in order to
challenge the ethnic-religious uniformity of the Kemalist civilization ideal and to
justify their claim to social diversity and political pluralism. Accordingly the
People’s Democracy Party HADEP, the political representative of the Kurdish
movement, stated in its 1994 programme: “We are the heirs of great civilizations
like Mesopotamia, the Hittites and Western Anatolia. Our historical heritage
shall be preserved and its pluralist structure shall be protected and
developed.”84
The Islamist Virtue Party FP, established after the Welfare Party was banned
in the course of the 1997 military intervention, couched its claim to political
participation in the following words:
81 See Öktem 2011: 106.
82 Demiralp 2012: 516.
83 Programme of the Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi MÇP 1988, 4.
84 Programme of the Halkın Demokrasi Partisi HADEP 1994, 10–11.
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We believe that our country, which was the cradle of diverse civilizations and is situated in
a very important strategic landscape, can only live in peace together with people of all
opinions in reciprocal understanding and tolerance within a democratic regime.85
To some extent the Virtue Party thereby set the tone for the Justice and
Development Party AKP that would succeed it in 2001.
The civilizing mission of the AKP
When in 2002 the Justice and Development Party came to power, the concept
of civilization experienced an astonishing revitalization. Often associated
with the ‘black Turk’ milieu,86 the AKP began to make extensive use of the
idea of civilization in its older version medeniyet. In particular Turkish
President and informal AKP-leader Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, known for empha-
sizing his ‘black Turk’ origin, operates frequently with the concept of
civilization.
The AKP’s approach to civilization includes two strands. As the first strand,
the party adopted the Kemalist idea of a singular and universalistic civilization
epitomized in the slogan ‘to raise Turkey above the level of contemporary
civilization’. This was part of what I would call ‘Islamic Kemalism’: The AKP
abandoned the Islamist project of its Millî Görüş predecessors which had tried to
challenge the hegemony of Kemalist secularism without success. Instead, the
party continued the secular institutions and sought to control them through its
pious supporters. In addition, it took over the Kemalist ideology and filled it
partly with new meanings, toned down secularism and added Islamic connota-
tions as well as references to the Ottoman past.
The appropriation of the Kemalist civilization ideal could be seen in the last
paragraph of the party’s 2002 programme, followed by the phrase “May God
help our nation”:
This programme is a project to allocate to our great nation the place it deserves in the
community of humankind and to make our country ‘rise above the level of contemporary
civilization’, a project of ‘democratization and advancement’ prepared by a staff that is
honest, principled and sensitive to local values, that is aware of global dynamics and
understands very well the present geography and age.87
85 Programme of the Fazilet Partisi FP 1998, 4.
86 See White 2013: 46–47.
87 Programme of the Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi AKP 2002, 64.
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Accordingly, the AKP legitimized its reform programme and its ambition to make
Turkey a full member of the European Union with Atatürk’s imperative to
achieve ‘the level of contemporary civilization’. During the power struggle with
the old Kemalist elite in the 2000s the Justice and Development Party presented
itself as the true champion of civilization.
In this sense then-Prime Minister Erdoğan used the expression muasır
medeniyet to brand the Kemalist opposition as ‘backward’, for instance in the
following statement of 2008 where he demanded the lift of the ban on head-
scarves in Turkish universities:
Before 2002 we experienced where Turkey got with artificial scaremongering, superficial
interpretations and prophecies. … With the same artificial fears, prophecies and backward
views Turkey will never reach the level of contemporary civilization.88
When the AKP government was increasingly criticized by both the domestic
opposition and the international public for monopolizing power, it justified its
policy in referring to a greater mission to ‘civilize’ Turkey. Together with the
government’s growing intolerance towards oppositional activities the missionary
character became more and more pronounced.
This is exemplified in Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements during the Gezi
Park protests of June 2013 denouncing the participants as ‘looters’ and ‘bandits’.
In October 2013, Erdoğan censured students who protested against a road
construction project on the campus of the Middle East Technical University in
Ankara:
Roads are civilization. But those who are not civilized do not understand a road’s value.
Even if there is a mosque ahead and the road will pass through it, we will demolish and
remove the mosque and rebuild it elsewhere.89
Not always as outspoken as Erdoğan, other AKP politicians also applied the
rhetoric of civilization. In June 2013 Hüseyin Çelik, AKP vice-president at that
time, replied to criticism of restrictions on the sale of alcohol as follows:
“Corresponding regulations exist in all civilized countries of the world.”90
88 “Başbakan Erdoğan’dan türban mesajı”, Radikal 23/10/2008. http://www.radikal.com.tr/
politika/basbakan-erdogandan-turban-mesaji-904816 (09/12/2008).
89 “Başbakan Recep Tayyip Erdoğan AK Parti grup toplantısında konuştu”, Hürriyet 22/10/
2013. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/24958036.asp (05/05/2014).
90 “Hüseyin Çelik: Gezi Parkı olayı vandalizme dönüştürüldü”, Zaman 05/06/2013. http://www.
zaman.com.tr/gundem_huseyin-celik-gezi-parki-olayi-vandalizme-donusturuldu_2097455.html
(15/05/2014).
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The above-mentioned statements about ‘backward’ Kemalists or ‘uncivi-
lized’ protesters thereby follow the pattern of previous Ottoman and Turkish
elites seeking to civilize ‘backward’ elements within.
There is, though, an important aspect where the civilization concept of
the AKP government differs from its predecessors. At least in the heyday of
its ‘new’ foreign policy, when the Justice and Development Party promised to
reshape the relations with Turkey’s neighbours according to the ‘zero pro-
blems’ doctrine, the party seemed eager to extend the Turkish civilizing
mission to the outside world.
Already in 2001, former Foreign Minister and later Prime Minister Ahmet
Davutoğlu had addressed this claim quite frankly in his programmatic book
Strategic Depth:
Concerning the formation of foreign policy this psychological modernization [of Turkey]
means the definition of its own hinterland (sphere of influence or backyard). With a
mentality accustomed to see oneself as the sphere of influence of others it is impossible
to build up an independent sphere of influence of one’s own.91
Later Davutoğlu specified this vision. Declaring that “Turkey’s most important
soft power is its Democracy”,92 he saw Turkey on a mission to spread democratic
values in Europe, the region and the world: “Turkey now enjoys an image as a
responsible state which provides order and security to the region, one that
prioritizes democracy and liberties, while dealing competently with security
problems at home.”93
Over the last years, this extrovert civilizing vision foundered on numerous
regional conflicts, some of which – like the Syrian civil war – were aggravated
by ideologically driven Turkish intervention. While the AKP’s foreign policy
mission in Turkey’s neighbourhood has failed, its ideological foundations can
still be felt in the second strand of the party’s understanding of medeniyet – the
reference to civilizations in the plural.
Davutoğlu’s foreign policy theory conceptualized the Turkish sphere of
influence as geographically and culturally defined ‘basins’.94 Mentioning the
great Islamic civilizations of the past (Arab Andalusia, Mughal India, and the
91 Davutoğlu 2001: 92–93.
92 Davutoğlu 2008: 80.
93 Davutoğlu 2008: 83.
94 Davutoğlu (2001: 119, 151 and 183) locates Turkey’s sphere of influence in a ‘Near Territorial
Basin’ (Balkans, Caucasus, Middle East), a ‘Near Maritime Basin’ (Black Sea, Eastern
Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Caspian Sea), and ‘Near Continental Basin’ (Europe, North
Africa, South Asia, Central and East Asia).
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Ottoman Empire), the former foreign minister emphasized the position of these
civilizations as bridges between different cultures.95
Davutoğlu’s definition of Turkey’s sphere of influence has led to character-
izations of the AKP’s foreign policy as ‘Neo-Ottomanist’. In fact the party’s
approach draws on a deep-rooted popular nationalism that has always existed
beyond the Kemalist nationalist doctrine and combines references to
Turkishness, Sunni Islam and Ottoman civilization.96 Jenny White calls the
nationalist vision of the AKP “Muslim nationalism” and points to similarities
with Ziya Gökalp’s concept of civilization.97
The construction of this indigenous idea of civilization can be seen in one of
Erdoğan’s speeches in which he praised in 2016 the work of pious foundations
(vakıf):
Our foundations have an important duty in raising our students as individuals with a
moral sense, bound to our fatherland and our nation, and useful for humanity. […] Our
civilization is a civilization of religious foundations which we can describe in a way as the
institutionalization of goodness. […]
While everyone else came to the Middle East to exploit and to loot petrol, we came with
our railways, our water pipelines, our caravanserais, our bazaars, and, most importantly,
with our culture of coexistence. […]
For their own interests they might take the risk to set the whole world on fire. Yet we will
take the side of justice, mercy, kindness and goodness because our faith, our civilization,
our history and our culture tell us to do so. […]
Wherever our civilization is there can be no Daesh [the Arabic acronym of the ‘Islamic
State’] or Boko Haram. Wherever our civilization is there can be no PKK, PYD or YPG
[Kurdish militias in Syria]. In the same manner, wherever our civilization is there can be no
Ku Klux Klan or Holocaust.98
This understanding of civilization also allowed certain adjustments of the policy
towards ethnic and religious minorities. The Kemalists’ blunt denial of minority
identities was thus partly replaced with an Ottoman-nostalgic idea of paterna-
listic ‘tolerance’ towards Kurdish, Arab, Alevi, Christian, Jewish and other
identities under the hegemony of a Sunni-Turkish majority.
In practise, however, the popular rhetoric of AKP politicians often mixes the
idea of a singular, universal civilization with those of a distinct Turkish-Islamic-
95 Davutoğlu 2001: 560–561. The author developed his approach in opposition to Samuel P.
Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” thesis (Davutoğlu 2001: 3).
96 Ramm 2011: 60–61.
97 White 2013: 48.
98 “Erdoğan: Bizim medeniyetimizin olduğu yerde DAİŞ, PKK, PYD, YPG olamaz”, Radikal 13/
03/2016. http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/erdogan-bizim-medeniyetimizin-oldugu-yerde-
dais-pkk-pyd-ypg-olamaz-1528584/ (13/03/2016).
1380 Christoph Ramm
Ottoman civilization as one of multiple civilizations. In a speech delivered in
2014 Erdoğan said, on the one hand, that during the Turkish War of
Independence “the Grand National Assembly of Turkey became a light of hope
for all the oppressed in our wider civilization basin”. Erdoğan praised, on the
other hand, Turkey’s progress in furthering democratization and strengthening
the rule of law, slamming his opponents within and beyond the Turkish border:
“The enemies of Turkey could not stop Turkey’s march towards civilization, and
they will not be able to stop it in the future.”99
Conclusion
The concept of civilization rivals the concept of the nation as the most influen-
tial ideological concept of late Ottoman, early republican, and contemporary
Turkish history. Since the mid-nineteenth century the succeeding, at times
rivalling elites of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic have adopted
these two inextricably linked concepts in the course of their modernization
efforts, and they have operated with them as discursive weapons against foreign
powers, political adversaries and deviant parts of the population.
Today ‘nation’ (millet/ulus) and ‘civilization’ (medeniyet/uygarlık) are con-
stituent terms of Turkey’s political language. Over the past two decades the
Turkish concept of the nation has been increasingly scrutinized and criticized for
its exclusionary, assimilatory and even genocidal potential. The concept of
civilization, however, has drawn far less attention, though it has been until
today equally powerful in shaping the world view of the elites and their
approach towards Turkish society.
The amplitude of the Ottoman/Turkish concept of civilization, to whose
variations radical reformers and religious conservatives adhered likewise, and
its historical persistence is not only the result of a process during which the term
medeniyet emerged as a potent synonym for modernity. From the early Ottoman
reformers to the present AKP leaders, medeniyet has conveyed the deep-rooted
desire to be recognized as equal by an overtly or covertly admired ‘West’.
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk moulded this desire in the formula “We shall raise
our national culture above the level of contemporary civilization”. Yet Atatürk
was one of very few Ottoman and Turkish leaders earning from his Western
contemporaries the desired admiration for his ambitious modernization project.
99 “Başbakan Erdoğan: 1 Mayıs’ın şiddetten uzak kutlanması en büyük arzumuz”, Hürriyet 30/
04/2014 http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/26328443.asp (15/05/2014).
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More often than not the Ottoman and Turkish elites failed in allocating “to our
great nation the place it deserves in the community of humankind”, as the
programme of the Justice and Development Party put it.
This failure could not only be attributed to Western anti-Turkish or anti-
Muslim sentiment based on either supremacist civilizationism or exclusionary
racism. It is inherent in the missionary character of the Ottoman and Turkish
‘self-civilizing’ project. The sense of inferiority profoundly entrenched in the
concept of medeniyet generated a perpetual civilizing mission that saw a colour-
ful society only in black and white – perfectly illustrated by the terms ‘black
Turks’ and ‘white Turks’. The imperial and later republican leaderships thus
assured themselves of their fragile elite status by marking out their ideal of
medeniyet against various ‘backward’ elements within, with a changing focus on
‘ignorant’ masses, ‘uncultivated’ peasants, ‘uncivilized’ tribes, ‘savage’ nomads,
‘reactionary’ traditionalists or ‘fanatic’ believers.
Thereby their civilizing mission not only reproduced the hierarchy of civili-
zation the Ottoman and Turkish elites so deeply resented as the embodiment of
Western supremacy. Instead of creating the necessary social cohesion for a
participatory modernization project this mission tended to cause frictions,
resentment and resistance, which then again served as justification for an ever
more determined civilizing fury. The uncompromising effort to achieve mede-
niyet at any cost was in many cases accompanied by oppression and violence
that eventually damaged the elites’ civilized façade.
The civilization concept of the Justice and Development Party shows this
dynamic in an exemplary way. Once themselves being excluded as ‘black Turks’
from social participation, the party leaders legitimized their claim on the state
resources (and on Turkey’s regional sphere of influence) with a rhetoric of
modernization and democratization that was couched in the Kemalist civiliza-
tion ideal. When the aspiration for EU membership began to flag and the’Islamic
Kemalism’ of the AKP government met with growing criticism and resistance, its
civilizing mission started to show the same aggressive features as the mission of
its predecessors, targeting the ‘looters’ and ‘bandits’ who dared to protest
against the party’s vision of a modern, civilized Turkey.
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